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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Cole v. Burns International Security Services*
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives
behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title
VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to
contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same
combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious
discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the
chickens. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the six years since it was handed down, the U.S. Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation2 has
generated much discussion, most of it centered around a perceived erosion
of the civil rights of employees who, as a condition of their employment,
agree to pursue employment disputes, including those involving statutory
claims based on discrimination, through arbitration rather than through the
traditional judicial forum.3 Of central concern is the notion, on the one
hand, that such agreements are usually drafted by employers and offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis and, on the other, that arbitration offers too few
procedural safeguards to protect employees' statutory rights or to promote
the public values embodied in civil rights legislation.
* 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
1 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoted in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 See generally Sarah R. Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees,
64 UMKC L. Rv. 449 (1996); Pierre Levy, Comment, Gilmer Revisited: The Judicial
Erosion of Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455 (1996); cf. Jennifer A.
Marler, Note, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: The Lower Courts
Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. to Include Individual Employment
Contracts, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 443 (1996) (supporting the extension of Gilmer but
advocating procedures to protect employees' civil rights).
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The Court in Gilmer did not reach the issue of whether such mandatory
arbitration agreements were lawful in the context of employment
contracts; 4 the Court limited its decision to holding that a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)5 can be subjected
to compulsory arbitration. 6 Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning did seem to
imply that arbitration could be compelled on the basis of an arbitration
clause in an employment contract.7 In that case, petitioner Gilmer filed an
age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) after being fired by respondent Interstate
Johnson/Lane Corporation (Interstate).8 Gilmer, who had worked as a
Manager of Financial Services for Interstate, had been required, as a
condition of his employment, to register as a securities representative with
the New York Stock Exchange. 9 In his registration application, Gilmer
agreed to arbitrate any employment controversies that might arise between
him and his employer.' 0 After he filed his charge with the EEOC and
brought suit in federal district court, Interstate filed a motion to compel
arbitration, 11 relying on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 12 The district
court denied Interstate's motion, based on its interpretation of the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 13 that
"Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a
judicial forum." 14 The Fourth Circuit reversed, 15 and the Supreme Court
affirmed. 16
4 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
6 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
7 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Stevens argues that the Court should have decided
the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1994), applies to
employment contracts. Although the issue had not been raised by the parties, it was
"clearly antecedent to disposition of this case." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36-37.
8 See id. at 23.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id. at 24.
12 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
13 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
14 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
15 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
16 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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The Gilmer Court, noting that "[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement,"1 7 rejected Gilmer's
argument that "compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant to
arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with the statutory framework
and purposes of the ADEA"' 8 as well as his contention that mandatory
arbitration would deprive ADEA claimants such as himself of a judicial
forum. 19 The Court agreed with Gilmer's contention that the ADEA was
designed to further important social policies as well as address individual
grievances but saw no "inherent inconsistency between those
policies.., and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination
claims," 20 noting that other statutes had been deemed appropriate for
arbitration. 21
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,22 the D.C. Circuit
both extended and refined-or arguably limited-Gilmer. Chief Judge
Harry T. Edwards, writing for the majority, held that section 1 of the
FAA23 excludes only employment contracts for employees directly engaged
in the transportation of goods in commerce, not contracts for all employees
who affect commerce. 24 The court also outlined, in greater detail than did
the Gilmer Court, the minimum requirements for an enforceable mandatory
arbitration agreement in the employment context. 25 In reaching its
conclusions, the court surveyed the extensive scholarship regarding the
concerns raised by allowing mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the
employment setting,26 and it addressed those concerns directly. 27 The court
concluded that such an arbitration agreement, to be enforceable, must
provide significant protections for the rights of employees, protection that
is comparable to what they would receive in a judicial forum. Specifically,
17 1d. at 26.
18Id. at 27.
19 See id. at 29.20Id. at 27.
21 For example, arbitration has been condoned under the Sherman Act, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
and the Securities Act of 1933. See id. at 28.
22 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
23 9 U.S.C. § 1.
24 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470.
25 See id. at 1480-1487.
26 See id. at 1473-1479.
27 See id. at 1479-1488.
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a valid mandatory arbitration agreement must provide procedural
protections--such as adequate discovery, 28 judicial review29 and reasonable
access for the complainant 30 -as well as substantive protections, ensured
by a right to counsel3 1 and by the use of competent arbitrators who are
familiar with employment law. 32 In what will doubtless be regarded as the
most controversial aspect of the case, the court also held that a mandatory
arbitration agreement will be unenforceable unless the employer pays the
arbitrator's entire compensation and expenses. 33
H. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN COLE
The plaintiff in this case, Clinton Cole, who worked as a security guard
at Union Station in Washington, D.C., was required to sign a "Pre-Dispute
Resolution Agreement" when the company he worked for was taken over
by the defendant, Burns Security. 34 The agreement stipulated that the
employee, in consideration for his employment, agreed to waive his right to
a jury trial and to arbitrate, at the company's option, any disputes governed
by the agreement, including "claims involving laws against discrimination
whether brought under federal and/or state law . . . . -35 After Cole was
fired in 1993, he filed charges with the EEOC and a complaint in the
District Court for the District of Columbia alleging, inter alia, race
discrimination and harassment based on race. 36 The district court granted
defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed Cole's complaint.37
Cole argued that section 1 of the FAA excludes all employment
contracts that even tangentially affect interstate commerce. That section
states, in part, that "nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." '38 The court, noting that this issue had
28 See id. at 1478-1479.
29 See id. at 1486-1487.
30 See id. at 1482-1483.
31 See id. at 1483 n.l1.
32 See id. at 1488.
33 See id. at 1485.
34 See id. at 1469.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 1469-1470.
37 See id. at 1470.
38 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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been raised but not decided in Gilmer, ruled that section 1 does not apply to
all employment contracts that affect commerce. 39 Acknowledging that the
legislative history of that provision could "be read to indicate that Congress
intended to exclude all contracts of employment from the coverage of the
FAA," the court, drawing on two canons of statutory construction,
nevertheless concluded that the Act does not exclude such contracts.40 The
first canon holds that a court must avoid a reading of a statute that "renders
some words altogether redundant." 41 The court noted that if "any class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" included "all workers
whose jobs have any effect on commerce," then "seamen" and "railway
workers" would be redundant. 42 The second canon "limits general terms
which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified"; 43 here,
"any other class of workers" takes its meaning from "seamen" and
"railway workers." The court concluded that although Gilmer did not reach
the issue of section l's scope, the reasoning of the majority "indicates that
the Court would be inclined to read section 1 narrowly. "'44
Ill. ENFORCEABILITY OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
AN EMPLOYMENT SETTING
Having thus determined that employment contracts are not excluded
from the FAA, the court turned its attention to what it called "the heart of
the problem in this case, i.e., the enforceability of conditions of
employment requiring individual employees to use arbitration in place of
judicial fora for the resolution of statutory claims." 45 Noting that the case
did not concern either a bilateral, "mutually voluntary decision to pursue
arbitration" or "the enforcement of arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement, "46 the court proceeded into a detailed analysis of the problems
raised by mandatory arbitration agreements such as the one endorsed by the
Gilmer Court.
39 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470.
40 Id. at 1472.
41 Id. at 1470 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995)).
42 1d.
43 Id. at 1471 (quoting Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)).
44 Id. at 1472.
4 5 Id.
46 Id. at 1472-1473.
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The court vigorously rejected applying to employment contracts the
justifications traditionally offered for arbitration in collective bargaining
agreements, 47 noting that, absent fraud, arbitrators in such agreements
serve simply as the "readers" of the contracts. 48 Arbitrators in collective
bargaining agreements have a strong incentive to satisfy both parties to the
arbitration--the employer and the union-because both parties are repeat
players who will participate in selecting the arbitrator for future disputes.
Furthermore, the rights created in a collective bargaining agreement are
contractual rights created by the parties rather than statutory rights
designed to reflect public values.49
Unlike a collective bargaining agreement, an arbitration agreement in
the context of an employment contract does not provide these procedural
and substantive safeguards. While the union can negotiate terms to the
collective bargaining agreement, for example, an employee such as Cole is
typically confronted with a contract of adhesion, which he can take or
leave, 50 and the fact that employers typically draft the agreements creates
the further danger that employers will "structure arbitration in ways that
may systematically disadvantage employees." 51 Additionally, the employer
enjoys the twin advantages of being more sophisticated than its employees
in selecting arbitrators, by virtue of the employer's experience, and of
47 See id. at 1473.
48 See id. at 1474-1475 (quoting Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MiCH. L.
REv. 1137, 1140 (1977).
49 See id. at 1475.
50 Id. at 1477. The agreement that Cole signed stated, in part, that:
In consideration of the Company employing you, you further agree that, in the
event that you seek relief in a court of competent jurisdiction for a dispute covered
by the Agreement, the Company may, at any time within 60 days of the service of
your complaint upon the Company, at its option, require all or part of the dispute
to be arbitrated by one arbitrator in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association. You agree that the option to arbitrate any dispute is
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and fully enforceable.
Id. at 1469.
51 Id. at 1477. As an example of systematic disadvantage, the court notes that "a
company might impose a requirement that the employee pay the fees for an arbitrator's
time in order to discourage or prevent employees from bringing claims." 1d.
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being the sole repeat player, an advantage that can lead arbitrators to favor
employers, who can be expected to hire the arbitrators in the future. 52
The court also noted concerns that many arbitrators are not qualified to
decide "purely legal issues" with respect to statutory claims and that many
arbitrators are not lawyers. 53 Furthermore, public disclosure, less important
in the context of collective bargaining because decisions are monitored by
both unions and employers, is much more important in the context of
individual statutory claims; binding precedent, the court observed,
"prevents a recurrence of statutory violations" and thus diminishes the
danger of a system that "systematically favor[s] companies over
individuals." 54
IV. THE COLE SOLUTION TO GIL MER
Despite these numerous misgivings, the court in Cole acknowledged
that under Gilmer "statutory claims are fully subject to binding arbitration,
at least outside of the context of collective bargaining." 55 Recognizing this
fact, the court endeavored to articulate standards of arbitration that
diminish the hazards that it had outlined. The court's starting point was an
unambiguous statement of the law: "Clearly, it would be unlawful for an
employer to condition employment on an employee's agreement to give up
the right to be free from racial or gender discrimination." 56 To ensure that
the employee does not give up that right, the court outlined several
procedural criteria by which to evaluate an arbitration arrangement.
52 See id. at 1476, 1485 n.18.
53 Statistics cited by the court indicate that
[A]t least 16% of arbitrators have never read any judicial opinions involving Title
VII; 40% do not read labor advance sheets to keep abreast of developments under
Title VII; and of those arbitrators who have never read a judicial opinion on
employment discrimination and who do not read advance sheets, 50% nonetheless
feel professionally competent to decide legal issues in cases involving employment
misconduct.
Id. at 1478 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Cases: An Empirical Study, PRoc. OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETFNG OF nm NAT'L ACAD.
OF Ai. 59, 71-72 (1976)).
54 1d. at 1477.
55 Id. at 1478 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 34-35).56 Id. at 1482 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51).
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Important to the court's analysis were the rules promulgated by the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), which require minimum
standards of discovery and stipulate, inter alia, that awards be put into
writing. 57 Citing Gilmer, the court noted that an arbitration agreement, to
be enforceable, must represent simply a change of forum and cannot result
in a complainant's foregoing his or her substantive rights under a statute. 58
Accordingly, under Gilmer, the arbitration arrangement must ensure that
the arbitrators are impartial and subject to meaningful judicial review; that
discovery is adequate; that all types of relief are available that would
otherwise be available in court; and that the employee not be required to
pay unreasonable costs-in other words, that "an employee who is made to
use arbitration as a condition of employment 'effectively may vindicate
[his] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." 59
Perhaps the most surprising standard established by the court is the
requirement that employers pay all of the arbitrators' fees and expenses.
One commentator has suggested that this requirement might be unique. 60
The court justified this ruling, over a vigorous dissent,61 by stating that "we
:57 See id. at 1480 (citing AMERICAN ARBrIRATION AssOcIATION, NATIONAL RuLES
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (effective June 1, 1996)).
58 See id. at 1481.
59 Id. at 1482 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28). In support of these principles, the
court also cites 1994 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR COMMISSION OF THE FUTuRE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30-31 and other studies
and scholarly works. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483, n.11.
60 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Growing Debate Over "Consumerized"
Arbitration: Adding Cole to the Fire, 2 Disp. REsOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 20, 21
(1997). In fact, at least two district courts have recently followed Cole in its approach to
fees. See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., No. C.V.A. 95-2500, 1997 WL 383150 (D.
Kan. June 4, 1997) (holding that despite arbitration award against employee, employer
is responsible for paying arbitrator's fee); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of
Colorado, Inc., No. 96 CV 2932, 1997 WL 416405, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 1997)
(holding arbitration agreement unenforceable because of its requirement that employee
pay one half of arbitrator's fees; requirement "operates as a disincentive to his
submitting a discrimination claim to arbitration").
61 The dissent argues, not unreasonably, that the issue of fees was not raised at trial
or on appeal and suggests, perhaps less plausibly (given the majority's point that such
agreements are often presented to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis), that the
arbitration agreement was reached by mutual consent of the employee and employer and
should, unless unconscionable or a product or duress, be enforced without the court's
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are unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a
beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services of
the judge assigned to hear her or his case." 62 The court does not forbid
charging the employee administrative and other fees that are similar to
those assessed against parties appearing in federal court, but the court
reasons that the additional arbitrators' fees, which can range from $500 to
$1,000 per day, could have a chilling effect on employees' asserting their
statutory claims. 63
Finally, in its effort to ensure fairness in the arbitration of statutory
claims, the court analyzes the standard of judicial review of arbitral
proceedings and at least implies that the standard must be higher than the
traditional "manifest disregard of the law" standard applied in the collective
bargaining context.64 Specifically, the court states that "the strict deference
accorded to arbitration decisions in the collective bargaining arena may not
be appropriate in statutory cases in which an employee has been forced to
resort to arbitration as a condition of employment" and that the "manifest
disregard" standard in this context must be "sufficiently rigorous to ensure
that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law." 65
V. CONCLUSION
As suggested above, it is likely that the most controversial aspect of
Cole will be the holding that an employer may not condition employment
on an employee's acceptance of an arbitration agreement that requires the
employee to submit his or her statutory claims to arbitration and to pay all
or part of the arbitrators' fees. The court, somewhat puzzlingly, links this
principle with a different issue: the concern that arbitrators will favor
employers. 66
It is probably true, as the court argued, that the mere fact that the
employer pays the fees will not in itself create arbitrator bias. But neither is
engaging in "contract modification." Cole, 105 F.3d at 1489-1491 (Henderson, C.J.,
dissenting).62 Id. at 1484.
63 See id. at 1486.
64 See id. at 1486-1487. Indeed, the court notes that the Supreme Court has not yet
defined the "manifest disregard" standard and that it is applied differently in different
circuits. See id.
65 Id. at 1487.
66 See id. at 1484-1486.
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it clear that such a scheme will do anything to diminish the structural bias
that such arbitration clauses invite. Requiring the employee to pay all or
part of the fees will not alleviate the problem of repeat players one way or
another. As the court noted, "[i]t is doubtful that arbitrators care about who
pays them, so long as they are paid for their services." 67
Nevertheless, while the employer's payment of all arbitration fees
might not exacerbate repeat-player bias, neither does it in any way diminish
the problem. The court does address this concern in some detail, noting
that "there are several protections against the possibility of arbitrators
systematically favoring employers because employers are the source of
future business"68--including the scrutiny of plaintiffs' lawyers and the
AAA; the possibility that employers who curry the favor of corrupt
arbitrators "will simply invite increased judicial review of arbitral
agreements";69 and the notion that arbitrators can be expected to "adhere to
the professional and ethical standards set by arbitrators in the context of
collective bargaining." 70
Yet as the court points out, arbitrators in the employment context are
not subject to the same pressures as are arbitrators in the collective
bargaining context. The "protections" the court lists do not fully answer the
wider concerns raised (even by commentators cited by the court)71
regarding the mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the employment
context. So long as employers have a say in selecting the arbitrators, and so
long as they remain more sophisticated than their employees in this area
(which they must, given their repeated experience), arbitrators will have an
incentive to see, perhaps only somewhat more clearly, the merits of the
employers' positions.
Arbitrators need not be "corrupt" to be subject to their own human
biases or to trigger the heightened scrutiny of the AAA or the courts.
Certainly the protections listed by the court can work to prevent obviously
egregious arbitral decisions and awards, but it is difficult to see how they
will guard against the more subtle biases that must almost certainly result
when an arbitrator's future well-being depends, even in part, on an
employer's good will.
67 Id. at 1485.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 1485 n.16.
272
[Vol. 13:1 19971
COLE v. BURNSINTERNATIONAL SECURITYSERVICES
The court cited two studies that indicate just such a bias, and yet
concluded that "[i]t is hard to know what to make of these studies without
assessing the relative merits of the cases in the surveys." 72 The studies
would appear to indicate that repeat players, such as employers, enjoy an
unfair advantage over nonrepeat players, such as employees.
Of course, the court in Cole has no alternative but to follow the strong
implication in Gilmer that the Supreme Court will almost certainly uphold a
mandatory arbitration arrangement as a condition of employment. In
enforcing Cole's arbitration arrangement, it is possible that the court is
simply attempting to control the damage to employees' statutory rights
implied in Gilmer. The Gilmer Court upheld the arbitration clause in that
case because it purportedly protected the employee's statutory rights. The
court in Cole outlines in much greater detail than did Gilmer the
prerequisites for enforcing such an arbitration agreement. In doing so, the
court comes close to requiring procedural safeguards as demanding as those
mandated by the judicial system, leaving one to question whether the
Supreme Court's "current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring [arbitration]" 73 has gone too far and will simply result in the
creation of a parallel, equally complex private judiciary.
James B. Geren
72 Id. The studies indicate that employees recover less often on claims against
repeat players than against nonrepeat players. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 685 (1996). The studies also indicate that "repeat-player
employers win in arbitration twice as often as nonrepeat players." David Segal, Short-
Circuiting the Courts: An Overburdened Legal System Has Turned Mediation into Big
Business, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at F12.
73 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481(1989)).

